

## **Article 10 on South Sudan**

### **Developments in South Sudan Conflict: the South Sudan Police Service**

Our Articles 1 to 3 and 5 to 9 were situation analysis of the conflict in South Sudan. Our article 4 (A) and 4 (B) were the first of our series on “Who is Who”. Our article 4 (C) is under editing. This article (10) is dedicated to the South Sudan Police Service.

The accounts of Articles 10 will deal with the failures and successes of the Re-building and Modernization of the South Sudan Police Service entrusted with civilian and social peace and harmony

### **SOUTH SUDAN’S POLICE SERVICE’S SAD STORY**

#### **Introduction**

In 2008, Canada funded a project on Security Sector Reform in South Sudan. The project was implemented by the North South Institute (NSI) in partnership with Juba University. As entry point the team of NSI met with Dr. Riek Machar. He was excited about the project and had two main concerns that he wanted the team to deal with:

1. Reform of the Police Service including community policing
2. Small arms in the hands of civilian population.

The NSI deemed that the small arms issue was beyond them, the funding and the project. But they stuck with the Police reform issue. The project became plagued with three successive incidents:

1. The brilliant South Sudanese professor and researcher who started the project died of leukemia in 7 months from the start of the project. A totally hopeless replacement was hired by NSI.
2. The NSI team leader on research and the project officer both left NSI and one joined one of the Canadian Universities and other became a PA to Dr. Francis Deng in the US
3. The team leader on resources and logistics left the project as well

While the end report was useless for “Security Sector Reform” it was an eye opener on the desperate state of the South Sudan Police Service.

#### **Status quo in 2010**

1. 70% of all the police service were illiterate
2. The well trained officers, staff officers and policemen who did not go to the bush were looked upon as those who spelt with the enemy and were marginalized

3. The officers who were appointed from the ranks of the SPLA either were too much “Militarised” or had no police training
4. The police service was not trained and was ill-equipped
5. The situation outside Juba in the States was very poor
6. Corruption and impunity were rampant.

### **Is there any change?**

In 2010 Kiir was convinced that he had to do something.

15,000 new recruits were approved for hiring to add to the then 30,000 existing force. Criteria were set and high school education was one of the prerequisites. The initial understanding was to have 2000 new positions for officers for promotions that were overdue. 13,000 were to be divided equally between the 10 states. That failed. In several states, the call for recruitment did not even get 1300 raw applicants. In some states the response was in the small hundreds.

6000 “cadets” were recruited and sent to Juba for training. 6000 as ONE badge were too many for Juba’s limited capacity. That greatly impacted negatively on the quality of training. The capacity of training in Juba could not have possibly accommodated that large number of recruits.

The states were then given the liberty to recruit 700 each or a total of 7000 policemen. The results were disastrous as some states had to totally ignore the criteria to even get applicants. However the training was much better as Juba only accepted 1000 at a time for training. Hence the quality of training was much better than the first 6000.

The International Community wanted to help and they did what was possible.

### **But something negative came out of this project:**

After 2005, large numbers of Southern Sudanese Youth studied and remained in Egypt, mainly in Cairo. They formed gangs and went into serious crimes including murders. These were large numbers and called themselves “Niggers”. The Government of Egypt, with the support of the Government of South Sudan (GRSS) extradited them all back to South Sudan and some went to Sudan and terrorised parts of rural Khartoum .

When the call for policemen applications was floated and literacy was a primary condition, these gangs were the best qualified and all those who applied were recruited. Only 2800 applicants had finished their high school education among the applicants for the 13,000 jobs available.

They were trained, they were equipped and graduated. They were put to the first test in Konjo Konjo market in Juba for one day. They reigned havoc! They terrorised the market and had to be pulled out. They were found to be better suited where there was need for education such as computers, radio and communication and were taken away from the front desks and contact with the population.

Another downside was that this group of ex” Niggers Gangs” wanted to remain liberal and better attached to each other than merge in the wider police community.

There were spells of crimes in Juba. But by January 2013, the crimes by criminals subsided. But the Police was *committing* crimes. In mid 2013, crime rose again

The force of South Sudan Police is now about 42,000 down from 45,000 due to desertion, dismissals or simply lack of interest in the job due to poor pay. The UK is now working on literacy programs for adult education for the illiterate police

## **Personnel**

The outgoing Inspector General of the Police (Removed in January 2013) was First Lt. General Achuil Tito Madut. His deputy was Lt General Gordon Luola who was also removed in January 2013 with his boss.

Regrettably Salva Kiir brought in an army Lt. General as Inspector of the Police Service. That is Lt. General Pieng Deng Kuol. He is the brother of Dr. Francis Mading Deng and an Ngok Dinka. When the violence started in Dec 15<sup>th</sup>, Gen Pieng left his police job and went to Bor with the SPLA fighting the rebels! His deputy is Gen Andrew Kol.

Another SPLA officer Gen Paul Malong also left his post as Governor of Northern Bahr El Ghazal and led SPLA forces fighting rebels in Unity State.

It is confirmed that Police Officers from the Nuer Tribe were treated with less fairness and equitability than Dinka Officers all along after 2005.

## **Why were the inspector general, his deputy and his Assistant for administration removed by a stroke of pen from Kiir?**

One of the successes of the Police Service was the building of a police “college” in Rajaf to graduate policemen. They are also currently building a police “academy” to train higher ranks officers. The international community set up a multi-donor fund for the police college and the training of the officers.

In a visit by the Commissioner of the UNMISS CivPol to Rajaf, investigators accompanied the entourage. When they got to Rajaf, they slipped away and interviewed male recruits and women recruits. They came out with serious and horrendous stories about corruption and rape of the women and abuse of male recruits in Rajaf. We believe that they had inkling about what was going on in Rajaf before they went on the visit. The UN wrote the full story in a letter to the Inspector General Tito after he was not prepared to take action on verbal reporting. The story was leaked to the Associated Press. Most of the donors stopped their support to the Police including Canada and Norway.

Kiir formed a committee that was allegedly bribed by Gen Tito. The committee took their recommendation straight up to Kiir. They recommended firing the Inspector General, his deputy

(who was never interviewed by the committee), the assistant Inspector General for administration among others. It was rumored that the investigation committee was avoiding interviewing officers who had information that the GRSS did not want to hear or come out. Corruption was at the heart of that.

Such high ranks were removed without prior reference to the Council of Ministers. Kiir put the council of ministers in the picture after he signed a “Decree” firing the high ranking officers.

The money embezzled was never returned. The sympathetic donors stayed away.

In April 2013 the Ministry of Interior (Police) confirmed that there were 11,000 “Ghost Policemen” who did not exist but their salaries were going out. Another 16,000 were under investigation.

However we must mention that there are now women police officers. About 10% of the Police Service are women. The highest rank among them is full colonel. The police ranks follow the army ranks!!

### **What were Kiir, Tito and later Pieng trying to do?**

“Reform and Transform” police on 15 pillars: Among them was

1. Human capacity Building
2. Police Structures
3. Police College
4. Police Academy
5. Internal and external training
6. Creating harmony
7. Improving leadership

They were also trying to do credible coordination of the Donor Committee and they entrusted that to the Deputy Inspector General who seems to have won the respect of donor representatives.

One of the major challenges for the police (especially traffic police) was the SPLA officers in the streets who always behaved as above the law. There was limited success in curbing their excesses.

### **Community Policing**

This was one of the dreams of Machar. Under Inspector General Tito and Deputy Inspector General Gordon Luola, community policing started and was implemented in Juba in Hai (locality) Rock City. Then they move and implemented it in Kator. Local youth were trained and cooperated with police and it reduced crime.

In rural areas, rural-friendly programs were developed and implemented in Bor and Pochola among other towns.

### **Police and small arms and light weapons (SALW)**

SALW is a problem of mega magnitude in South Sudan. The UN and others totally failed to do anything effective about it. There is a commission that was headed by a police General by the name of Falasha, who was fired by Gen Alison Manani Magaya (Ex-Minister of Internal Affairs) for alleged corruption; and the deputy running the commission has done little to activate it. The institutional capacity is zero and professional input is needed.

The problem of SALW will be compounded multi-fold after the current violence is addressed. After 2005 and after the campaigns for disarmament, the caches of SALW frequently got stolen by SPLA soldiers and offered and resold to civilians. The option of destroying the arms was not attempted.

A serious survey of assessment of the arms in the hands of civilian population was not done. That may be a starting point when the current violence ends; if it will.

### **Did the policemen join the rebellion?**

A well informed person tells us that large numbers of Nuer policemen had joined the rebellion. Please refer to our article # 9 on fragility of South Sudan and how the state has not really matured.

### **2015 Elections**

During the last elections of 2010 and in spite of the international observers' presence, South Sudan Police did a great job in providing security and logistics.

What about 2015? That is if they will take place in 2015. The police in South Sudan needs to be trained, prepared, funded and logistics planned. If the elections will be held in April, as they should, that is only 15 month away. But no one seems to be preoccupied with that now.

How will police be deployed to the various communities will needs new articulation. Can Dinka Policeman go to a Nuer area in the near future? And for that matter can any other government official?

Elections may be a way out of the current dilemma if both Kiir and Machar make a graceful exit as they both have oceans of blood on their hands, willingly or inadvertently.

### **Subsahara Centre, Canada**

[elkhazin@subsaharacentre.ca](mailto:elkhazin@subsaharacentre.ca) , [www.subsaharacentre.ca](http://www.subsaharacentre.ca)