

Article 37 on South Sudan

Developments in South Sudan Conflict: Reformed Process in Addis Ababa

Our Articles 1 to 3 and 5 to 36 were situation analyses of the conflict in South Sudan. Our articles 4 (A), 4 (B) and 4 (C) were the first of our series on “Who is Who”. This article 37 is dedicated to the new module of talks in Addis Ababa between the GRSS and the SPLM/A-IO

Facts on the positions of the three groups of Stakeholders: GRSS, the SPLM/A-IO and the “Other Stakeholders” or (OSH)

1. The SPLM/A-IO refused to come to the talks with a full hall of Secondary Stakeholders.
2. They demanded direct talks with the GRSS and went ahead with that on the sidelines of the main hall.
3. The GRSS writes officially to the IGAD mediation to continue with Direct Talks between the two primary stakeholders (GRSS and the SPLM/A-IO)
4. It is evident now it is the Troika that was shoving the Group 9 down the throat of the IGAD Mediation and the process.
5. Both CSO and the Coalition of the opposition parties in Juba and Diaspora blow their tops.
6. Lam Akol and the IGAD Mediation allow Lam and his group to enter the hall and bar the political opposition parties from Diaspora.
7. SPLM/A-IO objects
8. Joseph Okello ignites a bombshell: Lam Akol needs to sit with the Government Delegation and should not form a block on his own.
9. John Luk, on behalf of the Group 11 (now Group 9) vented his steam as well lashing on all sides and decrying exclusion.
10. Lam issues a fiery communiqué blasting everyone.
11. Both GRSS and the IGAD Mediation object to the communiqué and refuse to endorse it as a document of the Mediation.
12. The confusion and accusations and counter accusations are exchanged between the GRSS, the SPL/A-IO, Opposition Political Parties and CSO.
13. The SPLM/A-IO negotiating team meets with Dr. Machar and agrees that their negotiating team should join into the mess and the talks will fail and no one will blame them!
14. IGAD mediation realised that the Process was going nowhere and seems to have become aware of the possibility of massive failure and today comes up with a revised module.

The New Module

1. The GRSS and the SPLM/A-IO will, indeed, meet on their own and start discussing bilaterally the basics of the Transitional Government of National Unity.
2. Their outputs will then be brought to the Plenary for further discussion.

3. The outputs of the bilateral and the plenary will be taken by IGAD, harmonised if needed/ possible and given back to the parties.
4. Nhial Deng and Taban Deng shall be following up and agreeing further details.
5. The OSH and the CSO may meet on their own.
6. The new module will start with a workshop on the elements and Terms of Reference for a transitional government. Great step.
7. The only folder that shall not be subject to the process of consulting the “Multi-Stakeholders” will be the issue of “Security Arrangements”. That shall be a domain for the sole inputs from the GRSS and the SPLM/A-IO
8. This was advised to the parties today Saturday August 9th 2014 and verbally. There is nothing in writing so far and both the GRSS and the SPLM/A-IO are waiting to see if the new module will stick on Monday.

In spite of the possible futility of this module in outcomes and inherent dangers of having secondary stakeholder having “Quasi” engagement in the process it serves several purposes:

1. The “Multi-Stakeholders” are not driven away back to Juba and Nairobi
2. For many secondary actors the mere “presence” in Addis has value as their constituencies will still think they are engaged and hence “Important”.
3. IGAD Mediation made a major glitch by bringing secondary stakeholders into a hall of primary stakeholders. Being Africans, there was no way they make a U-Turn; hence 90 degrees turn is face-saving!
4. The Mediation looks like pleasing the Troika and other IPF Countries by giving space for the group 9. They fund the process, the IGAD, South Sudan and the relief.
5. Taking issues agreed or differed over by the two primary stakeholders to a wider plenary may give the two primary stakeholders second thoughts into the issues and how they may be resolved.

Dr. Riek Machar

1. Dr. Machar is not going to Sudan as circulating in Sudanese Media. He is going to Nairobi after tomorrow Monday to meet with the UNSC members in Nairobi (Not in Addis).
2. He seems to have been relocated into a new residence in Addis that has poor or no internet communication. Intentional? Inadvertent?
3. He and his top brass need to exit Ethiopia during the talks so that he and his senior aides can have the chance to do proper “Re-Entry” consultations with Gen Taban and Mr. Dhieu Mathok before any further agreements are signed.

With such new improved module for the talks, the date for the end of Round V must be made open. The 10th of August is tomorrow Sunday. We are still at “procedures”.

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