

Ottawa
Sunday, August-10-14

Article 38 on South Sudan

Developments in South Sudan Conflict: Corrections and addition to our article 37

Our Articles 1 to 3 and 5 to 37 were situation analyses of the conflict in South Sudan. Our articles 4 (A), 4 (B) and 4 (C) were the first of our series on “Who is Who”. This article 38 is dedicated to correcting some information we included in our article # 37 adding supplementary information.

1. Our assessment and reliable sources on the ground indicate that IGAD came to grips with the “Process” by now accepting direct talks of the principals (GRSS & SPLM/A-IO). May be a written and public “Process Outline” by IGAD Mediation will help both the negotiating parties and the analysts to better understand the new module.
2. Contrary to what we stated in our article #37, Dr. Machar left early this Sunday to Khartoum for the planned IGAD facilitated visit. Our apologies.
3. Dr. Machar yesterday had a follow up meeting with UN representative (believed to be Mr. Haile Menkerios) on the visiting Security Council Team. Dr. Machar was informed to prepare for a video conferencing meeting on the 13th August with the UNSC visiting delegates in Nairobi. Dr. Machar protested that as unjustified and unfair since the Security Council team will be in Nairobi and he preferred to have face to face talks and meeting with them in person.
4. If the efforts of Dr. Machar’s office are successful in changing the plan to a face-to-face meeting, he may proceed to Nairobi from Khartoum to meet the Security Council team.
5. One of the arguments of the SPLM/A-IO is that the UNSC team will meet Juba Government. As the UNSC team wants to do facts finding meetings on the status of the peace process (among other issues), the SPLM/A-IO feels that video conferencing with the team will not be adequate to relate the positions of the Opposition (All Africans are Face-to-Face Communities).
6. The developments in the Peace Process and the agreement on direct talks are certainly a big plus for the IGAD mediators.
7. IGAD and the Mediation team may need to work to alleviate the suspicion of being driven by TROIKA(We are only reflecting positions of stakeholders). TROIKA seems to be perceived by both GRSS and the SPLM/A-IO of wanting Kiir replaced by Pagan Amum or another minority group leader. The more the Mediators stay away from “Content” of the conflict, the less such perceptions will bug the stakeholders.
8. This allegation has, regrettably resulted in President Kiir’s financial hand outs through “cronies” to strengthen his position to stay in power for the transitional government. It will impact on the negotiations on the “Transitional Government of National Unity”.
9. The HRW 92 pages report released August 7th 2014 and titled “South Sudan’s New War: Abuses by Government and Opposition Forces” could not have come at a worse time for both parties. Damning. The section about Obasanjo’s Commission and their slow progress (or total lack of it-our inserts) points the Commission to an alarming direction of hybrid courts and the ICC. While this may be credible from a “Justice” point of view, the

possible ramifications on the “Political Process” need to be observed. The report points donors to very important areas of where they should put their money.

10. The donors from the International Community need to find ways (and there are ways) of being inclusive of the Opposition held areas for their outreach of community development, peace dividends and capacity building. Otherwise one third of the country with the most vulnerable will be left out.

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